New Court Cases

05/12/2015

Legal Issues Involving the Use of Personal Cellphones and/or Data Devices for Police Officers

By John V. Berry, Esq., www.berrylegal.com

With the significant number of high profile police cases in the media in 2015 law enforcement officers have found the need to be extra careful in every aspect of performing their public duties. In our practice of representing law enforcement officers, this concept should extend to a law enforcement officer's use of personal (non-Department) cellphones, tablets, etc.  

Due to the development of technology, law enforcement officers have been subject to increasing public scrutiny.  Often times, at any given traffic stop or other interaction with the public there are individuals with camera cellphones who record or otherwise attempt to capture footage of an officer performing his or her duties.  The natural reaction to this type surveillance by the public is for an officer to want to keep their own photographic or video records.  Our advice is to be careful in doing so for a number of reasons.

BE CAUTIOUS IN USING PERSONAL CELLPHONES

Taking photographs, video recordings or audio of events involving the public can cause a number of issues to arise for an officer.  Four immediate issues come to mind when we evaluated the downsides to an officer using their own personal cellphone or tablet while on duty.  

First, many departments ban the use of personal cellphones or tablet devices while on duty.  Hence, the officer can get into trouble by using their personal device.  We have defended officers that have received disciplinary actions for the use or possession of such devices while on duty.  Thus, it is important to find out the department policy (to the extent one exists) on the use of personal cellphones or devices on duty.  

Second, and equally important is the increase in litigation.  As the number of major media events involving police officers have increased over the years, so have the number of lawsuits.  One of the major issues that the courts are now seeing, once a lawsuit has been filed, are discovery requests which seek inspections of all of a police officer’s personal cellphones and/or data devices for information related to an incident. For instance, a plaintiffs' or criminal defense attorney might ask for copies of all photographs taken from an incident.  It is likely that the courts will further open the door to requiring officers to produce such information in the years to come.  

Third, depending on the jurisdiction (federal, state, county, local), taking audio, photographs or video of a private citizen may be restricted by law. There may be privacy laws which govern and restrict the ability to maintain or use such information.  In addition, in some jurisdictions video or audio recordings taken by an officer while in the line of duty might be considered public records and have a requirement that they be turned over.  

Fourth, no matter what the department rules or laws are that govern, it is very important that officers not post or otherwise disclose such information (video, recordings or other information) from an incident on the Internet.  We have seen this type of issue give rise to law enforcement offices in the form of department discipline and it is likely to increase in the years to come. Lawsuits have already been filed by individuals photographed, videotaped or recorded by officers on various grounds, on privacy grounds.  When these cases come to light the officer is inevitably charged administratively with discipline for doing so.  

CURRENT CASELAW

There have not been many reported court cases which have developed where the plaintiff, prosecutor or defendant seeks an officer’s private personal cellphone or tablet records, but they are certainly coming.  The most on point case, thus far, occurred in New Mexico, in State v. Ortiz, 215 P.3d 8111 (NM Ct. App. 2009).  In the Ortiz case, the defendant was  charged with driving while intoxicated.  The defendant’s attorney sought all records, including personal cellphone records from the officer involved in the arrest which may have aided in the defendant’s legal defense.  The court in Ortiz held that the government was required to turn over the officer’s cellphone records.

Not many cases have followed Ortiz as of yet, but as I mentioned above they are coming.  There is little doubt that evidence taken (e.g. photographs / video recordings of a crime scene) on an officer's personal cellphone will be likely required to be turned over in the future by the courts as the law in the area develops.  

CONCLUSION

Law enforcement officers are cautioned to know department policy when using personal cellphones or tablets while on duty.  Officers should also take care, even when authorized, to be aware that recordings (audio or video) may be later sought by a plaintiffs’ attorney or prosecutor.  Our law firm advises and represents law enforcement officers in disciplinary and civil matters. We can be contacted at www.berrylegal.com or by telephone at (703) 668-0070.  The Firm's Facebook page can be found here Berry & Berry Facebook Page. 

 

Posted at 03:56 PM in Administrative Defense, Current Affairs, New Court Cases |

Tags: attorney, civil lawsuit, lawyer, legal defense, legal issues, litigation, police attorney, police officer cellphone, representing police officers, subpoena, tablet

12/14/2012

Police Union Sues WMATA Over Illegal Termination of Officer

By John V. Berry, www.berrylegal.com

In an interesting case, Fraternal Order of Police Metro Transit Police Labor Committee v. WMATA, 1:12cv1387 (E.D. Va Dec. 4, 2012), the union that represents WMATA police transit officers, the FOP/Metro Transit Police Labor Committee, has filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asking that an officer be reinstated to his position.  The officer involved was terminated from his employment with WMATA for alleged misconduct and subsequently appealed his matter to arbitration through his union.  An arbitration board appointed to hear the case, later rescinded the firing and instead imposed a suspension of one-year as a disciplinary penalty in the case. 

The officer was then brought back  to work as an employee and placed on paid administrative leave.  However, in August of this year, the Maryland commission
which certifies law enforcement officers in that jurisdiction for WMATA denied his
recertification as a police officer.  Apparently, as a result, WMATA has refused to reinstate the officer involved in the matter because of the credentials issue.  The union argued, in their filing, that other officers were not required to have credentials but were still permitted to function as police officers. 

The union has filed the lawsuit at issue seeking the reinstatement of the officer, lost
backpay, litigation costs, attorneys fees and other remedies in this matter.  The case is interesting and one that will be of interest to police officers on the issue of wrongful
termination and to police unions on the issue of certification and continued employment.  The complaint is attached here.   Download Metro Transit Wrongful Termination Case

Posted at 02:58 PM in Current Affairs, New Court Cases |

Tags: arbitration, back pay, certification, court, credentials, fop, lawsuit, metro transit, officer, police officer, termination, virginia, wmata, wrongful termination

06/01/2012

U.S. Court of Appeals Affirms Police Officer Termination

By John V. Berry, www.berrylegal.com

In an interesting case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has upheld the
termination of a police officer from the City of Austin, Texas. The case, Smith
v. Acevedo, No. 10-51236 (5th Cir. May 24, 2012) involved a number of
claims from the officer involved, including violations of the First Amendment, Due Process and 42 U.S.C. §1983. 

The officer involved in the case was terminated by the Department for allegedly engaging in sexual harassment and insubordination.  The officer had apparently posted information about sexual harassment allegations that he found on the Internet about the Department’s Chief of Police.  The Department found out about the research that the officer had conducted and he was then charged with a number of general order violations. 

At the trial level in U.S. District Court, the officer prevailed on one count alleging that
the Department’s General Order was a prior restraint on free speech, but then only
awarded him the sum of one-dollar.  All of the significant counts alleged by the officer were dismissed by the District Court and the officer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The Fifth Circuit, on appeal, upheld the holding of the District Court in denying the officer’s appeal, ruling as follows:

“[I]t is clear that, beyond violation of APD General Order A201.04(G)(2), Smith was terminated based on his work performance, his disciplinary history, and sustained violations for unauthorized computer use and insubordination in both 2005 and 2008. Moreover, assuming that Smith was not charged with violating APD General Order
A201.04(G)(2), Smith conceded that he could have been terminated based upon the
insubordination or unauthorized computer use violations. Although Smith argues
that he would not have been terminated for those infractions, he fails to cite any evidence in the record to create a genuine dispute with the 2008 memorandum, which places significant emphasis on his recidivism. Based on these facts, it is clear that Smith suffered no actual harm for violating an unconstitutional APD General Order because Smith would have been terminated notwithstanding that violation.”

A copy of the court’s ruling is attached Download 2012 Acevedo Case  and should be read in full for a good context of what occurred in this case.  It is important in removal cases for police officers to have counsel advising them through these types of disciplinary actions.  Our law firm represents police officers facing disciplinary action and can be contacted at www.berrylegal.com for assistance.

Posted at 03:49 PM in New Court Cases |

Tags: 42 U.S.C. §1983, Acevedo, appeal, Austin, Chief of Police, Court, Court of Appeals, department, disciplinary action, Due Process, Due Process, Fifth Circuit, First Amendment, free speech, General Order, harassment, insubordination, officer, Police Officer, prior restraint, Smith v. Acevedo, Termination

01/23/2012

Wrongfully Terminated Police Lieutenant Files Federal Lawsuit Against Town

By John V. Berry, Esq., www.berrylegal.com

In an interesting wrongful termination case, filed on January 20, 2012 in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, a police lieutenant, in the Town of Wareham, Massachusetts has filed a lawsuit against his town alleging a number of improprieties in his firing.  In particular, the police lieutenant involved had been terminated for the alleged improper use of his town-issued cell phone, in addition to allegedly using his position as a police officer to sell alarm systems. 

Apparently, the backstory in this case involved elected officials who apparently were not fond of the lieutenant related to a promotion issue and sought to have him disciplined by the Town Administrator.  The Town Administrator asked the Chief of Police to review the allegations at issue and he refused to imposed serious discipline as a result of a lack of a telephone policy within the Department.  As a result, the Town Administrator was apparently placed on leave by the Board of Selectmen for not taking stronger action against the lieutenant.    

Of important note is the fact that the lieutenant appealed his termination to the Civil Service Commission who reviewed the termination and unanimously voted that the lieutenant had been wrongfully terminated.  The police lieutenant was given his position back and awarded back pay for his losses.  The police lieutenant returned to his position in June, 2011. For the actions associated with the wrongful termination, the police lieutenant filed suit and is seeking compensatory and punitive damages in addition to attorney fees.  

A copy of the Complaint is attached here.  Download Bliss v Wareham

 

Posted at 08:26 PM in Administrative Defense, Current Affairs, New Court Cases |

Tags: appeal, back pay, cell phone, civil service, civil service commission, compensatory damages, court, fired, lawsuit, lieutenant, Massachusetts, police officer, punitive damages, selectmen, suit, terminated, U.S. District Court, use of phone, wareham

04/08/2011

Terminated Police Officer Wins Reversal in Court

By John V. Berry, Esq., www.berrylegal.com

The Court of Appeal for California, in Anderson v. City of Los Angeles, Super. Ct. No. BS120430 (Mar. 30, 2011), recently affirmed the decision of a trial court to reinstate a police officer with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) who had been terminated for neglecting to request compensation for having worked overtime.  The trial court in this case found that no other officers within LAPD had ever been disciplined for failing to seek payment for overtime that they had worked and ordered the officer reinstated. 

On appeal, the LAPD argued that they should be permitted to re-evaluate the penalty to be assessed on the officer, instead of a blanket reinstatement and sought reversal.  The Court of Appeal in this case disagreed, finding:

“Significantly, the gravamen of this charge is the failure to request compensation for working overtime, not working unauthorized overtime. In fact, the charging allegation did not differentiate between authorized and unauthorized overtime. Although Anderson did admit that she committed misconduct by working unauthorized overtime and that she did not ask to be paid for the overtime she worked, as the trial court found, defendants have failed to point to a statute, rule or regulation, in force at the time the alleged misconduct was committed, that makes it an act of misconduct for a police officer to work overtime, whether authorized or unauthorized, and not ask to be compensated for it. Although Order 20 issued September 3, 1999 does state that overtime is to be reported on a specified form, it does not advise employees that the failure to do so is misconduct or will subject them to discipline and possible termination.

The trial court determined that the conduct charged against Anderson in count 1 did not constitute misconduct in the first instance. It is for this reason it concluded that Anderson's guilty plea, along with her deposition testimony, did not support the Board of Right's finding of guilt on count 1. Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination with regard to count 1, and defendants do not challenge the trial court's decision to grant writ relief as to counts 2 and 3, we have no basis for disturbing the judgment of the trial court.”

Id. 7- 9 (emphasis added).

CONCLUSION

The Anderson case illustrates the point that police departments that either invent new types of charges, or selectively prosecute administrative charges that have not been charged for similar conduct by others in the past, subject themselves to possible reversal in court, arbitration or before local merit systems review boards on appeal.  Departments that seek to charge new types of misconduct should first develop new policies coverage these issues, bargain where appropriate with police unions, and then fully explain and train police officers on issues that could rise to charges of misconduct.   

Posted at 03:03 PM in Administrative Defense, Fair Labor Standards Act, New Court Cases |

Tags: administrative board, administrative defense, arbitration, Court, disciplinary action, flsa, LAPD, Los Angeles Police Department, misconduct, overtime, Police Officer, termination, trial board

02/07/2011

Police Officer USERRA Military Retaliation Case Remanded for Trial

By John V. Berry, Esq., www.berrylegal.com

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a case involving a police officer employed by the Town of Ocean City, Maryland, recently held that the U.S. District for the District of Maryland partially erred in dismissing the police officer’s USERRA retaliation case.    The case, Bunting v. Town of Ocean City, No. 10-1140 (Unpublished Dec. Jan 31, 2011), found that the officer had in fact established a USERRA retaliation case that could proceed to trial.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Sergeant Bunting was employed by the Ocean City Police Department.  At the same time, he was also a member of the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve.  During a period of active duty, Sergeant Bunting missed out on an opportunity for promotion.  He subsequently complained in 2004 that he had not been selected on the basis of military discrimination.  Sergeant Bunning’s complaint was investigated by the Department of Labor (DOL-VETS) program. 

While the investigation was ongoing, another promotional opportunity arose in 2007 with the police department, and he did not receive this promotion as well.  Sergeant Bunning then filed suit for the original military discrimination issues under USERRA that had occurred in 2004, as well as the retaliation that occurred as a result of the non-promotion in 2007 based upon retaliatory grounds.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court’s finding that it was appropriate to dismiss the 2004 promotions/military discrimination claim, but reversed the District Court on the 2007 promotions/retaliation claims, reinstating Sergeant Bunning’s suit. 

LEGAL HOLDING BY THE COURT

The Fourth Circuit, in reinstating Sergeant Bunting’s USERRA retaliation claim for the 2007 promotion, held that he had established enough evidence to lead a reasonable jury to the conclusion that he had been retaliated against for exercising his rights under USERRA:

“We have reviewed the record, and we conclude that Bunting has adduced evidence rising to the level of a disputed issue of material fact. When DiPino was notified of Bunting’s complaints to the mayor, she informed Ocean City’s attorney that she was referring Bunting to the OCPD’s internal affairs bureau. In addition, Ocean City responded to the DOL-VETS’s communication by implying that Bunting would face discipline for failing to comply with OCPD policies. In light of the fact that these threats of discipline were made in response to protected USERRA activities, the statements clearly raise the specter of retaliation. Finally, in evaluating Bunting for a promotion in 2007, one senior officer commented that Bunting was unfit for promotion because he filed actions against the OCPD. We conclude that these facts could lead a reasonable jury to find that Bunting may have received promotions in 2005 and 2007 if he had not engaged in protected activities, i.e., complaining to the mayor and filing a USERRA complaint with DOL-VETS.”

THOUGHTS ON THE HOLDING OF THE COURT

This is a good decision from the Fourth Circuit with respect to USERRA retaliation claims.  USERRA retaliation cases tend to be more likely to be sustainable in court when comparted to lawsuits brought on the original claims of discrimination itself.  Furthermore, USERRA retaliation claims are usually much better received by the courts than other types of retaliation cases (e.g. those for discrimination under the Civil Rights Act) given Congressional intent to protect military personnel from acts of retaliation.     

Posted at 04:37 PM in New Court Cases |

Tags: active duty, Bunting, department, discrimination, DOL, Ocean City, police officer, promotion, retaliation, USERRA, VETS

01/31/2011

Baltimore Police Officer Files Suit in Shaving Case

By John V. Berry, Esq., www.berrylegal.com

A Baltimore police officer, Anthony Brown, has filed a lawsuit in Brown v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, Civil No. 11-CV-00136 (D. MD Jan. 2011), alleging that he was personally injured and humiliated when supervisors ordered him to shave in front of other officers. The police officer, an 18-year department veteran of the Baltimore Police Department, filed suit against the Department in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.

The officer had suffered from a skin condition which might shaving difficult, if not imopossible and had provided a physician’s note about these medical issues prior to his supervisor's order that he shave. Apparently, the physician’s note was ignored by supervisors and the officer was ordered to shave in front of the other officers, without water or a mirror.

Officer Brown has filed suit against the Baltimore Police Department regarding the forced shaving under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title 20 of the Annotated Code of the State of Maryland, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and 42 U.S.C. 1985 along with a number of other legal theories. The officer has further contended that his complaints resulted in poor performance evaluations, withdrawal of overtime opportunities and discrimination against him based on his medical condition. A copy of the latest version of the amended complaint in this case can be downloaded here Download Shaving Lawsuit

 

Posted at 06:39 PM in Labor Law, New Court Cases |

Tags: Baltimore, Baltimore Police Department, civil action, department, dermatology, lawsuit, Maryland, officer, police department, police officer, shave, shaving, skin, skin condition, supervisors, Title VII

01/14/2011

Interesting New LEOSA Case in the Context of Section 1983 Police Lawsuit

By John V. Berry, Esq., Berry & Berry, PLLC, www.berrylegal.com

In a new case, Bladdick v. Pour, Civ. No. 09-cv-330-WDS (S.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2010), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois has interpreted the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), in the context of a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Bladdick case make the argument that individual officer personal liability might be avoided when and if an officer does not comply with departmental LEOSA policies.

BACKGROUND

The Bladdick case involved a civil action dating from an incident that had occurred between November 8, 2008 and November 9, 2008 in the parking lot of a sports bar.  During the time in question, a number of off-duty City of St. Louis police officers had been present at a sports bar in Granite City, Illinois.  Three of the off-duty officers, including the defendant, Officer Pour, had been carrying their service weapons.  Officer Pour was at one point asked to leave the sports bar due to his alleged level of intoxication.

Officer Pour then went to the parking lot, where he was apparently discovered by the plaintiff in the lawsuit on the ground.  The facts are not clear, but the plaintiff allegedly attempted to help the officer up.  There was some dispute about what was said between the officer and plaintiff, but the plaintiff was shot in the torso by the police officer.  During the incident, the officer had not been wearing his uniform, did not display his badge, nor did he provide any indication that he was a police officer.

In response to the lawsuit against the officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the police department had argued that the officer had not been acting “under the color of state law.”  The importance here is the personal liability of the individual officer under Section 1983. 

COURT’S DECISION

The U.S. District Court found that the officer had not been acting under the color of state law and therefore that the case was not actionable against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In particular, the U.S. District Court found, in part, that the officer could not be subject to the Section 1983 claim, in part, because of his police department’s LEOSA policy:

"The nature of Pour's act was purely personal and not in furtherance of any official duty. This late night parking lot scuffle, which ended with the shooting of plaintiff by an intoxicated individual did not occur because Pour was clothed with the authority of state law. Furthermore, when plaintiff helped Pour up off the ground and Pour turned and shot him, he certainly misused his service weapon. However, in light of the evidence before the Court, the Court does not find that Pour's misuse of power was only made possible because Pour was "clothed with the authority of state law." In fact, Pour was stripped of his authority as a state actor as a result of his intoxication and the relevant policy that relates to intoxication.

The Board has provided a copy of the Department procedures which state that an officer is not to act while intoxicated. The Department procedure, which sets forth procedures for complying with the Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act ("LEOSA"), which authorizes the concealed carry of firearms, specifically provides: "LEOSA does not provide authority for a person to carry a concealed firearm while under the influence of alcohol or any other intoxicating or hallucinating substance." (Special Order SO 1-05, Doc. 72, Exhibit C.)"

The court then found that Officer Pour was not acting under the color of state law and because an action under color of state law is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a section 1983 claim, the court found that plaintiffs claim against Pour in his individual capacity had to be dismissed.  

LEGAL THOUGHTS

This is another opinion which impacts upon the interpretation of LEOSA.  Interestingly, the opinion makes the determination that the police department’s LEOSA policy, which the officer apparently was not in compliance with, helped the officer to avoid potential personal liability.  Given that individual police departments have typically instituted rather detailed and strict LEOSA policies in recent years, this may prove to be another effective method of defending an officer against personal liability in civil actions when police officers are sued in their individual capacities. 

 

                                                                                                                                       

Posted at 05:43 PM in H.R. 218, New Court Cases |

Tags: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, color of state law, law enforcement officers safety act, lawsuit, leosa, personal capacity, police officer, section 1983

01/13/2011

Court Invalidates City Attempt to Merge Police and Fire Departments

By John V. Berry, Esq., www.berrylegal.com

In an interesting legal decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals, in Harper Woods Fire Fighters Assoc. v. City of Harper Woods, No. 293062, 08-123054-CZ (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2011), struck down an attempt by the City of Harper Woods, Michigan to combine their police and fire departments. 

BACKGROUND

The City of approximately 15,000 residents, in Metro Detroit, originally had two separate departments for police and fire responsibilities. This changed in 2008, when the mayor of the City sought to merge the two departments.  In May of 2008, the City Council voted to merge the departments and to cross-train police officers and firefighters to serve both roles.  The program was apparently initially enacted to save on costs.  Eventually issues developed with the proposed program.

In mid-September, 2009, the Firefighters’ union brought suit against the City in regards to the merger and cross-training of police and fire personnel.  The union had sought and was granted an injunction against the City regarding the new program because it had violated the City Charter.  The City appealed the lower court’s decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

THE COURT’S DECISION TO INVALIDATE THE MERGER

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s action invalidating the merger, evaluating the case as follows:

The City asserts that interpreting Section 4.5 to prohibit its cross-training program would result in harm to the public. The City believes that the overall purpose for public safety services is to serve and protect, and a cross-training program is the most sensible way to accomplish this because it gives more people the skills to help others in emergency situations.

We disagree. Suggesting that not combining the functions of these departments will result in dangerous situations is itself absurd. Having separate departments for fire emergencies and law enforcement may allow both departments to function properly in a majority of situations. The trial court's ruling does not suggest that the police department is prohibited from acting during a fire emergency. The trial court stated that assisting any person in danger during fire emergencies is well within the police department's authority. This ruling allows both the police and fire departments to function properly as separate entities and does not create an absurd result contrary to public policy.

FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE CASE

This type of case appears to be on the front of an upcoming move by many state and local departments to attempt to save on costs as budgets are stretched.  While the case involved the interpretation of a specific city charter, I think that the overall tone of the decision was clear in that the Court of Appeals very much disapproved of the merger of the police and fire functions, referring to the attempt to merge the departments as “an absurd result contrary to public policy.” 

We are likely to see other variations of the merger issue come up in the future and I expect additional cases to involve these types of issues until the economy recovers.  

 

Posted at 12:41 PM in Current Affairs, New Court Cases |

Tags: appeal, court, cross-training, fire, fire department, firefighter, harper woods, injunction, lawsuit, Merger, Michigan, Michigan court of appeals, police, police department, police officer

01/11/2011

Merit Systems Protection Board Reverses Removal of Chief of Police

By John V. Berry, Esq., Berry & Berry, PLLC, berrylegal.com

In a fairly detailed legal opinion by the Merit Systems Protection Board in Chambers v. Department of Interior, 2011 MSPB 7 (Jan. 11, 2011) the MSPB has reversed a 2004 decision by the Department of Interior to remove former U.S. Park Police Chief of Police Teresa Chambers.  The ruling orders Chief Chambers' reinstatement to her former position within 20 days of January 11, 2011, along with backpay, and attorney fees.  

The reversal by the MSPB, following a number of years in litigation and appeals, is based upon a finding that the Agency retaliated against Chief Chambers for her whistleblowing activities under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).  The decision provided only 20 days in which to reinstate Chief Chambers to her former position.  With an incumbent currently occupying the position, this sets up a number of issues for an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit if one is filed.  The deadline to file an appeal is 60 days from the date of the decision (60 days from January 11, 2011).

For a copy of the entire legal opinion, download it here. Download 201101 Chambers MSPB Opinion

Posted at 08:06 PM in Current Affairs, First Amendment, New Court Cases |

Tags: Chief Chambers, federal circuit, Merit Systems Protection Board, MSPB, Park Police, reinstatement, Teresa Chambers, U.S. Park Police, Whistleblower Protection Act, Whistleblower retaliation, WPA

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